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CASE COMMENTS
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT: FOURTH LINE INJURIES
The Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act' rendered
unlawful any price discrimination2 which would produce injury to
competition. The amendments were the result of efforts to preserve
the traditional distributional marketing system. Congress deemed es-
sential the protection of the small independent merchant from anti-
competitive activities of mass distributors and chain stores, whose low-
price attraction to buyers was enchanced during the business crisis
of the 1930's.3 Since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,
price discrimination practices of suppliers, in order to be actionable
within the purview of the statute, must have produced injuries to
'Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), formerly Clayton Act § 2, ch.
323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Section x of the Robinson-Patman Act is an amend-
ment of section 2 of the Clayton Act. References to sections 2(a) and 2(d) are ref-
erences to 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), i3(d) (196 4). Discussion of congressional intention
with respect to the Robinson-Patman Amendments provides that
As originally conceived, the purposes of the Clayton Act's price dis-
crimination provision was to forbid "great and powerful combinations...
[from lowering] ... prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the cost
of production in certain communities and sections where they had competi-
tion, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of
their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby
acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or section in which -the
discriminating price is made.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63 d Cong., 2d Sess. 8- 9 (1914) as quoted in Gregory, A Survey
of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the Federal Trade Commission's Report on
Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTITRuSr BULL. 767, 785-86 (1968).
'Describing Robinson-Patman price discrimination, the Supreme Court has
said:
... there are no overtones of business buccaneering in the § 2(a)
phrase "discriminate in price." Rather, a price discrimination within the
meaning of that provision is merely a price difference ....
... "selling the same kind of goods cheaper to one purchaser than to
another."
FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (196o). See also FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948); Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 719
(7 th Cir. 1968); Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 702 (7 th Cir. 1968); Borden
Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 177 (5 th Cir. 1967); Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia
Basin Publishers, Inc., 293 F.2d 15, 24 (9 th Cir. 1961); Shore Gas & Oil Co. v.
Humble Oil & Refin. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D.N.J. 1963); Bolick-Gillman Co.
v. Continental Baking Co., 2o6 F. Supp. 151, 158 (D. Nev. 1961); Sano Petroleum
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 196o).
3F. RowE, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACr 3 (1962).
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competition within three lines of distribution.4 Hertofore, the so-
called "fourth line" injury5 has neither been defined, nor as a matter
of law, been held to be within the scope of the Act.6
However, in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 7 a private treble damage
suit, the Supreme Court reinstated a judgment against Standard Oil
Company of California (Standard) for price discrimination and its in-
jurious effect upon the competitive strength of its customer, Clyde A.
Perkins. The factual context in which this case arose gave definition
and legal status to the fourth line injury.
The parties indicated in their briefss that from 1945 to 1957 Per-
kins, an "independent" dealer, had purchased substantially all of the
gasoline for his service stations from Standard.9 Standard's gasoline
price during the specific period in question, 1955-1957, was higher to
Perkins than it was to Standard's own branded dealers, who were in
direct competition with Perkins. But more importantly, the price was
higher to Perkins than to Signal Oil & Gas Co. whose subsidiary's sub-
sidiary, Regal Stations Co. (Regal), was also in competition with Per-
kins. The issue was whether a Robinson-Patman action for price dis-
crimination was obstructed by the remoteness of Regal from Standard
in the distributional chain.10 (See Figure I, page 1o6.) The level of dis-
'I.e., (i) competition with the supplier, (ii) the favored purchaser, or (iii)
customers of either of them. See discussion of the three lines of injury in text
accompanying notes 41-64 infra.
'A fourth line injury is the anticompetitive effect on the business of a
supplier's disfavored purchaser which is manifest in a certain way. The supplier's
price discrimination benefits to its favored purchaser are passed on to allow the
customer of the customer of the favored purchaser (the fourth line distributor)
to offer a lower price than the disfavored purchaser can offer.
OSee Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 812-813 (9 th Cir. 1968).
7395 U.S. 642 (1969). The official citation is given here for future reference;
however, inasmuch as the official report has not yet appeared, further references
will be made to the Supreme Court Reporter for specific pagination. 89 S. Ct.
1871 (1969).
8Brief for Respondent at 7-22, Brief for Petitioner at 4-24, Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
"Competitive rivalry between Perkins and Standard could have been expected,
for the FTC assumes that the supplier-refiner competes with its own independent
customers and further that "the Commission constructs a model of the [gasoline]
industry in which the character of rivalry 'is largely shaped by competition flowing
from the producing level-the refiner'." FTC, REPORT ON ArncomPETrrvE PRAC-
TICES IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,373 (1967) as
quoted in Dixon, The FTC Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13
AMTxusr BULL. 105, 109 (1968).
"'Regal Stations Co. (Regal) purchased its gasoline from Western Hyway Oil
Co. (Western Hyway), which in turn had purchased it from Signal Oil & Gas Co.
(Signal) which had originally purchased from Standard. The price to Signal which
was lower than that to Perkins was passed on to Regal. A "close community of
interest" mentioned in Press Co. v. NLRB, 18 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert.
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tribution which Regal occupied in relation to the price discriminator,
Standard, was the fourth line.'1
Although formerly "one of the largest independent distributors of
gasoline in [the states of] both Washington and Oregon,' u2 Perkins al-
leged that he was forced out of business as a consequence of his in-
ability to compete in a price war 3 situation with Regal and the
branded dealers, who also had price benefits from Standard sufficient to
undercut Perkins' prices and attract his customers. Thus, Perkins had
to leave the market and sell out to Union Oil Co., one of the "major"
oil companies in the market area. However, not only did Standard's
price discrimination cause Perkins' ruin,' 4 but Perkins had repeatedly
notified Standard of its discrimination and his alleged injury. Also,
denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941), existed between the three corporations below Stand-
ard: during the relevant period Signal owned 60% of the stock of Western Hyway,
and similarly the latter corporation owned 55% of the stock of Regal. Thus
Signal was in a position to exercise control over Regal. Standard Oil Co. v.
Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 813 & n.6 (9 th Cir. 1968). See Figure I, page io6.
"89 S. Ct. at 1874; see note 5 supra.
-89 S. Ct. at 1872.
"rhe Federal Trade Commission has said that "price wars"
can be important instruments with which to secure price changes within
the industry and, as such, can be regarded as a sign of effective price
competition. Price wars, however, can be started for predatory purposes,
and during such disturbances, anticompetitive practices can develop.
FTC, REPORT ON ANTIcOMPETITIvE PRACTIcEs IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE, 3
TRADE R.EG. REP. 10,373 (1967). A comment on the FTC Report has outlined some
causes of price wars:
First, there is an ample supply of crude oil available and cost struc-
tures in both refining and marketing are dominated by fixed expense
so that additional sales are often sought to reduce average costs.
Second, because of supply pressures and inelastic total demand,
prices tend to be forced down, sometimes by new entrants, or independents
who purchase the "distress" product. Independents are becoming more
important in the marketplace because of the public's greater acceptance
of private brand gasoline.
Third, major companies often reduce prices to gain sales volume,
or to prevent losses in volume; some have also introduced new products
to compete directly with the low price offerings of others.
Dixon, The FTC Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13 ANTrrusTr BuLL.
1o5, 11o (1968). Cf. Judge Learned Hand's decision authorizing price reductions
in "gas wars" in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). But see FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505
(1963).
1 'Discriminatory pricing practices in price war situations, violative of § 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, result in elimination, despite their efficiency, of
competitively important, independent dealers and destruction of free and open
competition. FTC, REPORT ON AImcomPETITvE PRAcrIcEs IN THE MARI=NG OF
GASOLINE, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,373 (1967). Independent and major dealers are
closely related, for
1970]
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Perkins had made numerous requests for price concessions from
Standard in line with those given to his competitors. Standard did not
respond to these requests.
The jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon determined that Standard's price discrimination and Perkins'
destruction were causally connected and, in spite of the remote situa-
tion of Regal, awarded $336,404.57 in actual damages, which were
trebled and to which attorneys' fees were added to total $1,298,213.71 1
However, apparently impressed with the "fourth line" nature of the
transaction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
judgment on the theory that the verdict against Standard was "tainted"
by the inclusion of those damages occasioned by the competitive activi-
ties of Regal on the fourth line of competition.16 The court of appeals
held that the part of the injury, which was effected through such a dis-
tant distributor was not actionable.17 Because one of the favored
purchasers (Signal) did not resell the gasoline directly to its retail cus-
tomer (Regal), but instead resold to a subsidiary (Western Hyway)
which, in turn, resold to its subsidiary, Regal, the injury occasioned
by the transaction was a fourth line injury' s and beyond the scope of
the Robinson-Patman Act.' 9 Certiorari was then granted by the Su-
preme Court to consider whether a fourth line injury was within the
scope of the Robinson-Patman Act.
2 0
The Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held that it was not signifi-
cant that Regal was on the so-called fourth line. As long as causation
could be established 2' between price discrimination and injury, the
discriminating supplier could be held liable for injury to competition
regardless of the number of levels through which the discrimination
any attempt by a major to "discipline" independents in a market will have
repercussions upon other majors because of the interlacing of market areas
.... it is difficult to imagine that major companies would attempt to
drive out the independent firms which were their customers.
Dixon, The FTC Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13 ANrrRusT BULL.
105, 120-121 (1!68).
5Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 29 F.R.D. 16 (D. Ore. ig6i).
16Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 8o9, 813 (gth Cir. 1968).
'171d. at 816.
'$Note 5 supra.
lStandard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1968).
2'393 U.S. 1013 (1969).
-"The Court stated, "If there is sufficient evidence in the record to support an
inference of causation, the ultimate conclusion as to what that evidence proves
is for the jury." 89 S. Ct. 1871, 1875 (1969). Causation must be established between
the price differential and the injury to competition, "... where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition...." Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
[Vol. XXVII
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passed.22 In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave weight to the
argument that statutory interpretation should not exalt form (the
remote distributional level of Regal) at the expense of economic reality
and the purposes of the Clayton Act.2 The district court was therefore
correct in submitting the question of causation to the jury.
The dissenting opinion did not accept the fourth line concept,
24
but preferred a second line interpretation on the facts in the instant
case. Justices Marshall and Stewart concurred in the holding to re-
verse the court of appeals, but dissented as to the grounds and as to
the conclusion to reinstate the verdict.25 They viewed the facts as con-
stituting no more than a second line injury and found no fourth line
injury at all.26 They believed that the competitive injury should be
treated as if it were directly between Signal, the favored purchaser, and
Perkins, because the chain of distribution (Standard, Signal, Western
Hyway, and Regal) included subsidiary companies whose acts were
attributable to each other on principles of agency.27
In deciding Perkins, the Court was faced with the same problems
of interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act that have led invariably
to confusion for the bench, the bar, the affected supplier, and the legal
writer.28 Enacted by Congress to prevent strangulation of small, inde-
'It was not even necessary to prove supplier control over terms of sale to
the fourth line. An actionable claim was perfected by presenting evidence that
Standard only knew of the passing-on of the price benefit and of Perkins' imminent
destruction caused by the price discrimination. 89 S. Ct. 1871, 1875 (1969). But cf.
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 39o U.S. 341 (1968); American News Co. v. FTC, 3oo F.2d
1o4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (i962). Contra, Purolator Prod., Inc. v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965).
n89 S. Ct. at 1874-75. In support of this proposition it has been stated that
... the determinants of enforcement policies must always lie centrally
in the intent and purpose of the statute, the facts of the market place
and the court decisions applying the statute to these facts.
Address by FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones, ABA Nat'l Inst. on Antitrust
Prob. in the Sale and Distrib. of Goods, Los Angeles, Calif., Nov. 9, i967, as quoted
in Gregory, A Survey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the Federal Trade
Commission's Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTrITsr BuLL. 767, 791 (i968).
2489 S. Ct. at 1876; see note 5 supra.
m1t should be noted that Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
-"Note 5 supra; text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
-They reasoned that the jury verdict should be sustained but preferred to
"explicitly limit the holding to the facts of the case." 89 S. Ct. at 1876.
OSee Rowe, Current Developments in Robinson-Patman Law, 21 Bus. LAw.
499 (1966); Backman, An Economist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 ABA
ANTITRUsr SE UON 343 (1960).
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pendent merchants29 by the predatory pricing practices30 of some mass
distributors and "chain stores,"3' section 2(a)3 2 of the Act allows the
courts to prohibit "price discrimination" 33 when the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with the customers of either of
them .... 34
These confusing phrases are the statutory tools which the courts have
interpreted as delineating the proper scope of supplier liability in
"price discrimination" litigation. The word "discrimination" has been
applied in broader areas of commerce as litigation continues to shape
the law,3 5 so that when, as in Perkins, suppliers find new ways to di-
versify their distributive marketing techniques or integrate the func-
tions of distribution,36 they often find that business practices which
they consider advantageous are being adjudged illegal.ST
The traditional three lines of distribution (interpreted from the
phrase, "with any person who ... grants or knowingly receives ... or
with the customers of either of them,") 38 have been well defined.30 A
2See generally REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP.
No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-8 (1936).
1'See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend
the Clayton Act, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 144, 239 (1935).
'Describing the outcry during the depression years against the anticompetitive
activities of the chain stores, it was said of Robinson-Patman that, "... one certain
big concern had really caused the passage of this act, the A&P Tea Co.," Repre-
sentative Patman, Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend Section 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
3"Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964); see note i supra.
8A price discrimination within the meaning of section 2(a) is merely a price
differential. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 549 (196o); cases cited note
2 supra.
8'Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"E.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
363 U.S. 536 (196o); United Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966). See generally, Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
Note Oppenheim's discussion of the "Rule of Reason" as one standard for anti-
trust litigation.
-For analysis of "integration of distribution" see M. DE CHAZEAUt & A. KAHN,
INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY (1959); J. MCLEAN & R. HAIGH,
THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES (1954); Kessler & Stern, Competition,
Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959).
"See A. NEALE, THE ANTrrITuST LAWs o THE U.S.A., 244-45 (1960).
"Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
E.g., FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 US. 536 (1960).
[Vol. XXVII
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discussion of their elements, however, will be helpful in understanding
distribution and competitive injury and will serve as further back-
ground to understanding the fourth line injury.
4 0
"Primary line" (". . . any person who... grants... the benefit of
such discrimination ...,)41 injury is the result of "zone pricing" and
presents the question as to whether a supplier's price differentiation is
a fair competitive tactic or a predatory geographical pricing scheme in-
tended to destroy competition. 42 Discriminantly undercutting prices in
one geographical section,43 while maintaining higher prices and profit
margins elsewhere,44 frustrates local competition by impairing the com-
petitive strength of independent businesses which cannot afford to sell
so cheaply or indeed below cost.45 Predatory intent is often an im-
portant element.4 6 The indicia of primary line injury include mono-
poly power of the supplier in wide markets, 47 aggressive underselling
"See generally von Kalinowski, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects,
17 ABA ANTnusUr SECION 360, 362-87 (i96o).
'1Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
'-Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1957); Volasco Prods.
Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 904 (1966).
"Local price under-cutting has been viewed as anticompetitive if there were
some indication of intent to injure. The "diversion theory," although on the
decline, held that a seller's diversion of business from his rivals, through in-
creased quantity discounts, produced injury. F. ROWE, PlucE DiSCcmNINAnON
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 151-63 (1962). See also Hiram Walker, Inc. v.
A 9- S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5 th Cir. 1969); Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d
696 (7th Cir. 1968); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7 th Cir.
1968); Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5 th Cir. 1967); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1966); Foremost Dairies,
Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
"The practice of price differentiation in different localities indicates
that the majors "dump" products with the intent of injuring independents,
and that the losses thus incurred "are subsidized by sales at higher prices
outside the zone or by profits secured from non-gasoline production where
price competition is either minimal or non-existent."
Dixon, The FTC Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL.
105, 116 (1968).
"Predatory intent to expel a rival is the makeweight in the balance between
the desire to promote all possible healthy price competition and the wish to avoid
the sort of competition which is characterized as a local pricing war, the victor
of which is always the competitor with the deepest pockets. See Note, Competitive
Injury Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1597, 16o2 (1961).
"Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v. Mead's
Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Vance v. Safeway Stores, 23o F.2d 144 (1oth
Cir. 1956); cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.
Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (gth Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 US. 991 (1956).
'"Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (0oth Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 US. 843 (i96o); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 US. 858 (1929).
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of weak rivals, 48 deep and sustained undercutting of rival's prices, 49
persistant sales below supplier's cost, 50 and actual or impending de-
mise of the supplier's sole rival in the market. 51
"Secondary line" competitive injury (". . . with any person who
• . . knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination . . .,);2
occurs when the supplier rewards different customers with scaled price
benefits according to their rank in the distributive hierarchy. 53 When
the favored jobber, who is the grantee of the price discrimination sells
to consumers in competition with the unfavored retail merchants of
the supplier, the jobber undercuts prices on the same distributive line
by taking unfair advantage of the "favored purchaser" position he oc-
cupies.5 4 When the supplier's discrimination produces the effect of two
different prices to two of his customers who function on the same line,
then with a showing of profit impairment on the part of the disfavored
customer, the injury is actionable.55 Price differential is prima facie
evidence of injury to competition unless the causal connection between
the injury and the discrimination is vitiated by some defense.56
"Tertiary or third line" injury (". . . with the customers of either
of them")57 is actionable with evidence of the use of a "dual distribu-
tion"58 tactic. A supplier grants a lower price to its wholesalers who
4 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Maryland Baking Co.
v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957).
"Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 3o F.2d 234
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
r4United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 3o F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
"Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Atlas Building Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block
& Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (0oth Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (196o).
52Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37 (1948); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965); General Auto Suppliers, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7 th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965); Bain & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp.
541 (E.D.N•Y. 1957); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 56o, aff'd, 237 F.2d 13
(3d Cir. 1956); Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
'Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1O9 (1965).
"Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
"FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329
F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
57Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"See Gregory, A Survey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the FTC Report
on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTrIUSrT BULL. 767, 768, 792 (1968); Effective Regula-
tion of Dual Distribution: A Robinson-Patman Approach, 1967 DUKE L.J. 996;
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, STUDIES OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION: THE FLAT
GLASS INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 1915, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
[Vol. XXVII
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pass the price differential on to their retailers, and those retailers com-
pete with the retailers who purchase directly from the supplier at a
much higher price. The price discrimination is not between two direct-
purchasing customers of the supplier (as in secondary line) but affects
competition between the directly disfavored retailer and the indirectly
favored retailer who receives the benefit of a lower price which the
supplier originated and the wholesaler passed on to him.59 The rule
with respect to liability for third line injury is found in Standard Oil
v. FTC6O where it was provided that a supplier "should not be required
to police its wholesalers and to sell to them at [the supplier's] peril," 61
but should only "be liable if it sells to a wholesaler it knows or ought
to have known is engaging in or intends to engage in"62 the price cut-
ting in sales to the retail level.63 Injury to competition on the "third
line" assumes an actual passing-on of the supplier's price differential in
the favored customer's resale price with knowledge by the supplier of
the injurious effect.64
The newly conceived "fourth line" distributor is three levels re-
moved from the supplier. He is the customer of the customer of the
favored purchaser of the supplier. The fourth line injury affects com-
petition as between the supplier's disfavored purchaser and the fourth
line distributor, the beneficiary of the lower price to the favored pur-
chaser. The supplier's lower price to his favored purchaser is passed
on twice until it is reflected in the low competitive prices of the mer-
chant on the fourth level. There is, therefore, one more link in the
chain of distribution through which the goods are passed-one more
middleman. Hence, as a matter of policy, the supplier should not be
able to immunize himself from the Robinson-Patman Act by merely
adding links to his distributional chain.65
Perkins may play a significant role in future litigation, for the Su-
'Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1956); Krug v. I.T.&T. Corp., 142
F. Supp. 230 (DN.J. 1956). See generally C. AUSTIN, PRice DISCRIMINATON 51-52
(1959).
00173 F.2d 21o (7 th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 34o U.S. 231 (1951).
For a discussion of the Standard Oil controversy and its relation to the rule of
third line injuries see Gregory, A Suruey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of
the Federal Trade Commission's Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTIrrRusr
BULL. 767, 769 (1968).
a173 F.2d at 217 (1949).
OId.
0Cf. Secatore's Inc., v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 17, F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
"Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, '73 F.2d 21o, 216 (7th Cir. 1949); cf. Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
'See generally Effective Regulation of Dual Distribution: A Robinson-Patman
Approach, 1967 DuKE L.J. 996.
19701
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preme Court has extended the scope of the Robinson-Patman language
so as to render the supplier accountable for remote effects of his pricing
policy by making unlawful the injurious effects of fourth line and per-
haps any line6 6 of price discrimination and has called the traditional
three-level limitation "wholly ...artificial" and "completely unwar-
ranted by the language of the Act." 67
Prior to Perkins, it was suggested that, by making the supplier ac-
countable for the possible injurious effects of passing on the lower
price to distributors, the Act would require the supplier to control the
discount and profit margins of all middlemen, to police the favored
purchaser's resale tactics, or to condemn altogether any "dual distri-
bution" 68 system.69 The Federal Trade Commission's policy stated,
however, that "[w]e cannot protect competitors to the detriment of
competition itself."70 The shift in emphasis to the Perkins theory,
which makes the supplier liable for injury proximately caused by his
pricing differentials, was forecast by another case, FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc.71
Fred Meyer was an interpretation of Robinson-Patman section
2(d)72 wherein the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held that
a retailer who buys through a wholesaler may be regarded as a direct
"customer" of the supplier, not a third line distributor.73 To give
effect to the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act, the decision imple-
689 S. Ct. at 1875.
07d. at x874. In addition, Perkins -provides that causal connection must be
shown "regardless of the level" in the chain of distribution on which the injury
occurs.
'8Dual distribution has been defined as the
distributive technique by which the manufacturer sells its product to
independent wholesale distributors while simultaneously competing with
those purchasers through its own division distributors.
Note, Effective Regulation of Dual Distribution: A Robinson-Patman Approach,
1967 DuKE L.J. 996, 998.
"See Krug v. I.T.&T. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 23o (D.N.J. 1956). As late as 1962,
it was thought that even third line injury orders were inherently incompatible
with antitrust policies. F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT, 205 (1962).
°'BTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE,
3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,373 (1967).
71390 U.S. 341 (1968).
72Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (d) (1964); note 1 supra.
3FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); cf. Monroe Auto Equip. Co.
v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 1oo9 (1965); Gregory, A
Survey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the Federal Trade Commission's
Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANITrRusr BULL. 767, 774 & n.15 (1968).
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mented the "indirect purchaser" doctrine74 which imposes liability
upon a supplier who, in effect supplants intermediary distributors and
exerts control over his distributor's accounts. One is allowed to regard
links in the distributional chain as if they were distribution members
of an association performing an integrated function, so that in apply-
ing Fred Meyer to Perkins, lines of distribution may become meaning-
less and a fourth line distributor can be viewed as a second or third
line distributor.
Whether a case involves one of the three traditional lines of dis-
tribution or not, causation between the supplier's price differential
and the disfavored purchaser's competitive injury must be proved, as a
matter of fact, in order to establish liability.75 However, until Perkins,
the plaintiff in a 2(a) action.7 had the burden of proving both a causal
relationship and the appropriate line of distribution on which the in-
jury occurred.77 As a result of Perkins, causation is emphasized and
proof of the distributional line is no longer necessary.
The Supreme Court has abolished the established three line inter-
pretation of the language of the Robinson-Patman Act.7 8 Proof of
causation will not be affected by the level in the chain of distribution
on which the injury occurs. 79 In addition, under the reasoning of
Fred Meyer, the traditional three line interpretation remains valid, but
all distributors, no matter how many lines removed from the supplier,
will be treated as "customers" on the secondary line for the purposes of
the Act.8 0
However, the Court seems to leave the business community without
a dearly defined rule, in that while the three level limitation is now
abolished, its vestiges still provide the basis of liability under the Fred
Meyer principle. Although Mr. Justice Black did not directly concern
the court with statutory interpretation, his discussion of the language
7'The indirect purchaser doctrine was first formulated in American News Co.
v. FTV, 3oo F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Note, Trade Regulation-Sect. 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act Requires Promotional Allowances to Direct Buyers to
be Made Available to All Retailers Purchasing Through Wholesalers, 21 VAND.
L. REv. 1129, 1132 (1968).
089 S. Ct. at 1874.
"8Note I supra.
17 Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 812-13 (gth Cir. 1968).
"89 S. Ct. at 1874.
79Id.
0Id.; FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc. 390 US. 341 (1968). The FTC foresaw the
confusion and meaninglessness of lines of injury when it announced, "competitive
levels and their functions are impossible of precise description and any attempt
at definition necessarily requires frequent use of qualifying phrases." FTC, REPORT
ON ANTzcoMPrrrnvE PRACrICES IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
10,373 (1967).
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of the Act leads one to infer a construction of the Robinson-Patman
Act's coverage.
A diagramatic scheme of the language of the Robinson-Patman Act
would categorize the first several clauses of section i(a) as jurisdictional
requisites,8 1 and the second set, the scope of the Act. It is the second
set of clauses that is crucial.
v.. where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of
them. (emphasis added).8 2
The most difficult problem to resolve in construing the statute
seems to be the significance of the word "or" (italicized above). The
mentioned "effect" of discrimination must be present "in any line of
commerce" or with "any person who .. .grants," "any person who
... receives," or "the customers of either of them."
If the word "or" is an interpretive or expository qualifying con-
junction which is used in the sense of "to wit," "id est," or "that is to
say," then it introduces an explanation of what precedes and gives to
that which precedes the same signification as that which follows.8 3 In
other words, the phrase "with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers
of either of them" (which sets out the traditional three lines of com-
merce) limits and explains what "in any line of commerce" means.
Therefore, the scope of the Act should be limited to three lines.
However, if "or" literally means "or," it is a disjunctive particle
which denotes an alternative between the two phrases it connects.8 4 In
that situation, the line of proof that must be established to make an
actionable claim under the Act would require proof of injury either
81Jurisdictional elements of commerce, commodities, sales, and geographical
scope are found in the following language of the Robinson-Patman Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tion are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, con-
sumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States ....
s"Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § i3(a) (1964).
8See Benny v. Bell, 291 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); W.S. Libbey
Co. v. Johnson, 148 Me. 410, 94 A.2d 907, 910 (1953).
81See Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, io Ill. App. 2d 245, 134 N.E.2d
653, 658 (1956); Gay Union Corp. v. Wallace, 112 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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"in any line" or "with any person who . . . grants, . . . knowingly re-
ceives ... or ... the customers of either of them." In that case, the
broader and clearer phrase, "in any line of commerce" would allow an
action for injury with respect to the fourth line or any other line.
Heretofore, the "or" has always been interpreted in the sense of "to
wit," and the construction of the Act has thus provided for a three
line limitation on Robinson-Patman actions.8 5 It was thought that the
framers of the Act intended a less burdensome proof than the Clayton
Act required, and the cases followed Representative Utterback's 1936
conception of the coverage of the Act.8 6 He thought that the limitation
within which a price discrimination can reasonably be assumed to have
an identifiable impact on competition extended only to the customers
of the grantor or grantee.8 7
Apparently the Court in Perkins construed the word "or" as mean-
ing literally "or" and wished to void the three-line rule as to the
limitations of liability under the Act.88 In fact, Mr. Justice Black sees
the "to wit" interpretation as artificial and "completely unwarranted
by the language or purpose of the Act."89 The Court accepted the tenet
that the interpretation should be governed by the economic realities of
the market situation (for example, the apparent tendency of suppliers
to attempt to immunize themselves from Robinson-Patman actions by
adding a fourth rung to their distributive ladders). 0
Perkins renders meaningless any Robinson-Patman discussion of the
lines of distribution, no matter how remote, so long as price discrimina-
tion, causation, and seller's knowledge of injury are established. Since
a cause of action requires no proof of lines, price discrimination litiga-
tion is remarkably simplified for plantiff's counsel.
JOHN F. Ln.TsLA, III
-See, e.g., cases cited notes 2 and 35-40 supra.
$OId. note 87 infra.
678o CONG. REc. 9417 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utterback).
s8Petitioner asserts in his brief (at p. 38) that the Court has never decided this
issue with respect to the coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act and the meaning
of the language. For a discussion of the meaning of "in any line of commerce"
in a case decided upon the original Clayton Act see George Van Camp & Sons
Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
w89 S. Ct. at 1874.
90Id.
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